Congress found that many States, in turn, sell this personal information to individuals and businesses. III) (citations omitted). He held that 1) the DPPA was an acceptable exercise of Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause, because drivers' information was an "article of interstate commerce" within the terms of the Act, and 2) the DPPA did not "commandeer" state authority in the manner which the statutes involved in New York v. United States and Printz v. United States did. v . may include a person's name, address, telephone number, vehicle description. 6-10. Syllabus Opinion [ Rehnquist ] HTML version PDF version: HTML version PDF version: Opinion of the Court. Condon was Copyright © 2020, Thomson Reuters. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, Jan Graham of Utah, Mark L. Earley of Virginia, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin; for the Home School Legal Defense Association by Michael P. Farris; for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. Reno v. Condon. disclosure of personal information "for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft, motor vehicle emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories, performance monitoring of motor vehicles and dealers by motor vehicle manufacturers, and removal of non-owner records from the original owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers to carry out the purposes of titles I and IV of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, the Automobile Information Disclosure Act, the Clean Air Act, and chapters 301, 305, and 321-331 of title 49."
Because drivers' personal, identifying information is, in this context, an article of commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to. Baker Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (full-text). South Carolina, led by Attorney General Condon, sued to block enforcement of the act. Coyle Under that law, the information contained in the State's DMV records is available to any person or entity that fills out a form listing the requester's name and address and stating that the information will not be used for telephone solicitation. §§2721(b)(11), (13), and (d). See 155 F.3d 453, 463-465 (1998); 972 F. Supp. v. South Carolina, represented by South Carolina attorney general Charlie Condon, filed suit, alleging that the DPPA violates the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the United States Constitution. L. 106-69, 113 Stat.
But the fact that drivers' personal information is, in the context of this case, an article in interstate commerce does not conclusively resolve the constitutionality of the DPPA. Because the driver's information that the DPPA regulates was historically used by insurers, marketers, and others engaged in interstate commerce to contact drivers with customized solicitations, and therefore this information in this context constitutes “an article of commerce” subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause. Held: day-to-day responsibility for administering its complex provisions," Brief for Respondents 10, and thereby makes "state officials the unwilling implementors of federal policy," id., at 11.3 South Carolina emphasizes that the DPPA requires the State's employees to learn and apply the Act's substantive restrictions, which are summarized above, and notes that these activities will consume the employees' time and thus the State's resources. Thus, the DPPA is consistent with the principles set forth in those cases. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit. The DPPA is generally applicable because it regulates the universe of entities that participate as suppliers to the market for motor vehicle information-the States as initial suppliers of the information in interstate commerce and private resellers or redisclosers of that information in commerce. The DPPA generally prohibits any state DMV, or officer, employee, or contractor thereof, from "knowingly disclos[ing] or otherwise mak[ing] available to any person or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record." See, We further noted: "The NGA [National Governor's Association] nonetheless contends that §310 has commandeered the state legislative and administrative process because many state legislatures had to amend a substantial number of statutes in order to issue bonds in registered form and because state officials had to devote substantial effort to determine how best to implement a registered bond system. (1983). The District Court and Court of Appeals rejected that argument. , With him on the briefs were Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Mark B. Stern, and Alisa B. Klein. 521 U. S., at 902. To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. See 155 F. 3d, at 465; 972 F. New York Like the statute at issue in Baker, the DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens. Pp. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit. We accordingly conclude that the DPPA is consistent with the constitutional principles enunciated in Brief for Petitioners l(a), 2(a). v
RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. The District Court concluded that the Act is incompatible with the principles of federalism inherent in the Constitution's division of power between the States and the Federal Government. 540 U.S. 141 (2000) ... See Travis v. Reno, 163 F. 3d 1000, 1002 (CA7 1998) (noting that the Wisconsin Department of Transportation receives approximately $8 million each year from the sale of motor vehicle information). A "motor vehicle record" is defined as "any record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator's permit, motor vehicle title, motor vehicle registration, or identification card issued by a department of motor vehicles." The District Court and Court of Appeals ruled for the State, and United States Attorney General Janet Reno asked the Supreme Court to reverse this decision. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA) against a Tenth Amendment challenge. Ibid. However, the DPPA does not violate those principles. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. 514 U. S. 549 Concluding that the DPPA is incompatible with the principles of federalism inherent in the Constitution's division of power between the States and the Federal Government, the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina granted summary judgment for the State and permanently enjoined the DPPA's enforcement against the State and its officers,[3] and United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.[4]. and , Concluding that the DPPA is incompatible with the principles of federalism inherent in the Constitution's division of power between the States and the Federal Government, the District Court granted summary judgment for the State and permanently enjoined the DPPA's enforcement against the State and its officers. INS We accordingly conclude that the DPPA is consistent with the constitutional principles enunciated in New York and Printz.[5]. support congressional regulation.